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In this working paper, we explore the reactions of target groups to populist discourse through 
focus groups in five European countries and perform a quantitative analysis of Facebook data 
in eight European countries. We demonstrate the ways in which populist discourse and 
policies affect target groups including migrants, ethnic or religious minorities, academics, and 
LGBTIQ+ groups. 
 
Focus groups revealed that organized religion is an agent of populist movements. The 
Catholic Church in Poland and the Greek Orthodox Church legitimize and disseminate 
populist discourses. We also find that vulnerable groups complain about mainstreaming of 
hate language in their countries. The rise of populist movements and these movements’ 
eagerness to express controversial opinion on issues including immigration, homosexuality 
and political liberalism caused certain groups examined in this paper to appropriate these 
opinions and voice them in everyday life. Vulnerable groups, in an attempt to counterpoise 
the populist challenge in their countries, have developed four main strategies: i) creating echo 
chambers, ii) self-censorship, iii) migration, and iv) active resistance. Echo chambers enable 
members of vulnerable groups to avoid what they deem unnecessary and potentially 
unpleasant encounters with supporters of populist movements. It provides them with a 
comfort zone where they can express opinion more freely. Self-censorship, similar to echo 
chambers, helps target groups to stay under the radar of populist movements and their 
supporters. Those defending migration state that the process in their countries is irreversible 
and migrating to another country is the only way out. Finally, some participants argued that 
rather than conceding defeat, they actively resist through civil society organizations, street 
protests, and openly display their identity to fight off populism. 
Analysis of Facebook data revealed information about the ways in which populist parties and 
leaders communicate on social media and how the public perceives their communication. 
Populists use an anti-elitist language more frequently than mainstream political actors. Turkey 
and Hungary are exception to the rule, because in both countries populist governments have 
been in office for a long time. Second, populist actors in all countries but Poland and Turkey 
talk about immigration more. In Germany, France and the UK, populist actors frequently 
discuss EU-related issues. We also found that populists in Germany, France, Italy and the UK 
talk more about ‘democracy and legitimacy’ than mainstream parties do whilst populists talk 
about these issues less than mainstream parties do in Greece, Hungary and Turkey. 
Analysis also suggests that populist actors’ Facebook posts obtain more reactions, shares, and 
comments than mainstream political actors’. Anti-elitist language in social media posts 
produces more reactions, shares, and comments. Posts with references to religious minorities 
trigger fewer reactions from the users while posts making references to ethnic minorities, 
including immigrants or asylum seekers, as well as country-specific minorities like Roma in 
Hungary or Kurds in Turkey, trigger more reactions, and these posts are shared more. Finally, 
we find that posts referring to ‘immigration’ trigger more reactions and shares and produce 
more discussion than other issues.  
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In this working paper we focus on under-studied dimensions of populism at micro-, meso-, 
and macro-levels, putting European citizens’ responses and reactions to populist policies at its 
core. In particular, we investigate how citizens are affected by and how they react to populist 
discourse as well as policies implemented by populist actors. In this context, we combine two 
different types of research design. First, we study reactions of several vulnerable groups that 
are targeted by populism in several countries in Europe; these groups include but are not 
limited to Roma citizens, LGBTIQ+, gender rights activists, and immigrants. In particular, we 
explore the ways in which these underrepresented groups in eight different countries (Turkey, 
Greece, Hungary, UK, France, Poland, Italy and Germany) are affected by and react to 
populist movements and discourse in their countries. Second, we look at the reaction of 
Facebook users to populist communication in these eight countries; to draw general 
conclusions about the impact that the language and the topics emphasized by populists have 
on the broader public of social media users. In pursuing these goals, we rely on two data 
sources: focus groups in five countries and social media (Facebook) data in eight countries. 
Focus groups allows us to study the effects of populism and the populist discourse at the 
micro-level while studying citizens’ reactions to populist posts reveals the macro trends. 
Accordingly, this study enables us to have a comprehensive picture providing crucial 
information about citizens’ reactions to populism at various levels.  
 
In what follows, we first provide a theoretical framework and define our research questions. 
Then we summarize our methodology. That section is followed by findings of focus groups 
and the quantitative analysis of Facebook data. The last section concludes with a discussion of 
some implications of our findings for countering populist rhetoric. 
 
Theoretical framework and research question 
Previous research suggests that populist movements exploit people’s need for security to 
generate support within the society (Homolar and Scholz, 2019; Kinnvall 2019). Populist 
movements deliberately frame a situation as an existential threat in order to legitimize their 
style of governance (Muller, 2017). These movements frequently promote a particular reading 
of what they deem a threat as to define who is the ‘friend’ and who is the ‘foe’ in society 
(Foucault, 1980). Accordingly, populist movements agitate the people by using perceived or 
imagined threats and anxieties that the people experience against their lifestyles, traditions, 
and culture (Kinnvall, 2019). This populist strategy augments citizens’ negative image of 
their country and the challenges they face (Homolar and Scholz, 2019), eventually causing the 
people to consolidate their support for populist movements.  
 
A defining characteristic of populism is its tendency to define an ‘other’. As Muller (2017) 
and Mudde (2017) argue, populist movements define a ‘people’, who is virtuous, and the 
‘other’, who is excluded from the definition of the people by populist movements on the 
grounds that unlike the ‘authentic’ and ‘virtuous’ people, the other is immoral, alien, and 
inauthentic. Populist movements use the other and the actions of the other in their articulation 
of existential threats against the people. For example, after losing major support in the June 
2015 general elections, the populist AKP government in Turkey had benefited from the 
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Kurdish question 1  as an instrument to build security perceptions. This populist strategy 
enabled the AKP to consolidate conservative-nationalist votes (Sahin, 2021), eventually 
winning the party the November 2015 general elections. 
 
While previous research has focused on the demand and supply sides of populism (Guiso, 
2017, 2020; Mols and Jetten, 2020; Sahin, forthcoming), our knowledge on the reactions and 
strategies of ‘the other’ (vulnerable groups) in the face of populist discourse and policies is 
quite limited. This situation represents a major gap in the literature, as exploring this 
dimension would help us devise methods in our efforts to protect and empower vulnerable 
groups against populist movements and populist discourse. Through focus groups and a 
quantitative analysis of Facebook posts, we aim to provide information about how various 
groups targeted by populism in Europe respond to the populist challenge. In this respect, we 
benefit from two major data collection methods: focus groups and social media data.   
 
Methodology 
Focus Groups: We conducted 12 focus groups in five different countries. Table 1 shows the 
location of the focus groups, the name of the target groups, and the number of focus group per 
location. Research teams conducted two focus groups in each country. The exception to this 
rule is Turkey where we conducted four focus groups. In choosing target groups, our priority 
was to select groups that were particularly targeted by populist movements in each country. 
Hence, rather than doing focus groups with pre-determined groups, we asked each team to 
pick two groups that are targeted by populist movement(s) in their countries. Accordingly, our 
selection of groups presents variety in terms of their identity. 
 
Table 1: Location of target groups and number of focus groups 
Country Group 1 Group 2 
Turkey Gender Rights Activists (2 focus groups) White Turks2 (2 focus groups) 
Greece LGBTIQ+ (1 focus group) Immigrants (1 focus group) 
Hungary  Roma citizens (1 focus group) Academics (1 focus group) 
UK Remainers (1 focus group) Immigrants (1 focus group) 
Poland LGBTIQ+ (1 focus group) Women (1 focus group) 
 
We asked the teams to include between six and 10 people in each focus group. Table 2 below 
shows that the number of participants in the focus groups varied between six and nine. In 







                                                 
1 Kurdish question refers to the conflictual relations between the Turkish state and the Kurdish minority in 
Turkey.  Though the most recent wave of clashes between the state security forces and the PKK, pro-Kurdish 
armed guerilla movement, started in 1984, the roots of the issue rest on the early Republican era, when the 
state’s centralization policies alienated the Kurdish minority.  
2 We define White Turks as upper or upper middle class secular Turks who do not vote for the Islamist populist 
AKP government in Turkey. For more information on White Turks, see Demiralp (2012). 
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Table 2: Name of target groups 
 Target Group Name Group Size 
Turkey Gender Rights Activists Group 1 9 
Gender Rights Activists Group 2 6 
White Turks Group 1 8 
White Turks Group 2 9 
UK Remainers3 6 
Immigrants 8 
Hungary Academics 6 
Roma Citizens 6 
Poland LGBTIQ+ 9 
Feminists 7 
Greece Immigrants 6 
LGBTIQ+ 6 
 
In choosing our sample, we benefited from two methods:  
 
1. Recruitment through stakeholders such as NGOs or community organizations 
2. If the number of participants recruited through these strategies were low, we used 
snowball sampling to increase the number of participants. 
Our initial plan was to conduct focus groups face-to-face. However, by the early March 2020, 
the Covid-19 pandemic became a major threat to public health, making domestic and 
international travel as well as large indoor and even outdoor gatherings not only risky but at 
times impossible. Thus, research teams conducted focus groups online through secure 
platforms such as Microsoft Teams. All participants signed consent forms before interviews 
and meetings were recorded with the permission of participants. The recordings were then 
transcribed by the members of research teams and were analyzed to determine recurring 
themes and patterns.  
 
Social media data: The aim of this part of the study was to investigate the impact of populist 
communication online by looking at the activity of official Facebook pages of the main 
parties and politicians in France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Turkey, and UK, 
from August 2019 to October 2020. We focused on Facebook for two reasons. First, 
Facebook is the most widely used social network site in Europe. According to Statcounter, in 
2020 it covered about 80% of the market share among the social media sites.4 Furthermore, 
anecdotal evidence in European countries such as Italy suggests that mainstream media 
frequently use the statements made on Facebook by the official pages of politicians to 
understand politicians’ positions over several issues. Second, social media such as Facebook 
or Twitter are important channels for communication used by populist parties and leaders 
(Schaub and Morisi, 2020; Wells et al., 2016; Sahin et al., forthcoming). Given our focus on 
statements by official pages of parties and politicians, and the widespread public usage of 
Facebook, we conclude that this exercise is a good proxy for studying the impact of online 
populist communication tout court.  
                                                 
3 We define Remainers as UK nationals who voted ‘No’ in the 2016 Brexit referendum.  
4 See https://gs.statcounter.com/social-media-stats/all/europe/2020 
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Our data for this analysis consists of all the Facebook posts sent by the selected public pages 
in the period considered. To select these public pages, we started from the political parties: we 
included all populist parties that obtained at least 5% of votes at the European Parliament 
(EP) elections in 2019.5 There are a few exceptions to this rule. First, we included two parties 
that fell below the 5% threshold but were nevertheless considered important: UKIP in the UK 
and Konfederacia in Poland. Second, we excluded KKE in Greece because neither the party 
nor its leaders have an official Facebook account. After the selection of political parties, we 
collected data for three types of accounts: (1) the official page of the party, (2) the party 
leaders, and (3) the party media stars.6 Based on these criteria, we downloaded data from 114 
public pages, obtaining at the end a database with the size of about 129,000 Facebook posts. 
The data were obtained using the platform CrowdTangle. Details about the dependent 
variables are further discussed below, for other information on the quantitative text analysis of 




Strategies and responses against the populist challenge:  
Focus groups revealed that vulnerable groups targeted by populist movements in various 
countries have developed four important strategies or responses to deal with populist 
discourses and policies. We also found that these strategies are not mutually exclusive, 
meaning that individuals might use one or more of these strategies simultaneously. These 
strategies are as follows:  
 
a) Echo chambers: Target group participants in different countries argued that they 
abstain from interaction with people who do not share the same views with them. This 
trend is observable both on social media and in general. For example, a participant 
who voted Remain in the 2016 Brexit referendum stated that on social media, he 
unfollowed people who voted Leave. He suggested that this is because he became 
both closer with Remain voters and less motivated to interact with Leave voters in the 
aftermath of the Brexit referendum. Participants in Turkey also expressed similar 
feelings. A Turkish participant explained that he only makes friends with similar-
minded people who oppose the Islamist-populist AKP government. Hence, echo 
chambers are a popular strategy because it allows members of target groups to avoid 
conflict and express their opinions more freely.  
 
b) Self-censorship: A second strategy used by participants is self-censorship, which is 
prevalent especially in countries where populist authoritarian governments are in 
office (i.e. Hungary, Turkey) but also in other countries such as the UK. For instance, 
academics targeted by the populist FIDESZ government expressed that the 
government’s public animosity and discourse towards liberal social scientists causes 
                                                 
5 Please note that Turkey did not participate in the 2019 EP elections. Hence, to select parties in Turkey, we used 
the results of the national elections in 2018.  
6 With “media stars” we refer to all the important figures in the public debate, related to the parties selected, who 
were not holding an official position as party leader in the period of observation. An example is Jeremy Corbyn 
in the UK, who was not leader of the Labour party in the period of observation, but is a publicly well-known 
figure, with a large number of followers on social media. 
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many academics to be more careful when choosing their research topics. In Hungary, 
academics who are active in gender studies became extremely careful in choosing 
topics for their research. This is because FIDESZ has become publicly aggressive 
towards LGBTI+ movements as well as feminist movements, as it suggests that the 
norms associated with feminists and LGBTI+ movements are against ‘Hungarian 
national values’. Similar hesitations to express views freely in public were also 
common in Turkey. White Turks suggested that they tend to keep their views to 
themselves in the public sphere including social media because they are afraid of 
being targeted by the government or its supporters.  
 
c) Migration: A third strategy used by vulnerable groups across different countries is 
resorting to migration. In fact, this strategy was a commonly uttered by all groups in 
five countries. For instance, a Hungarian academic mentioned that one fellow 
colleague has not only left the profession but also the country after FIDESZ repeatedly 
targeted liberal academics. A woman participant in Poland also explained that the 
present political climate in the country makes migration an attractive option not only 
for her but also other women who does not want to accept the state policies regarding 
women (i.e. near-total ban on abortion).  
 
d) Active resistance: The previous three strategies defined above are defensive 
mechanisms mostly geared towards trying to stay under the radar of populist discourse 
and aggressive policies (in Hungary, Poland, and Turkey, where populists are in 
office). However, there is also another strategy repeatedly mentioned by different 
participants in each country. This strategy is activism as a form of resistance.  
LGBTI+ groups, which are targeted by right-wing populist movements, have 
responded the populist challenge in Europe through civil society organizations or by 
taking to the streets to protest. In Greece, LGBTI+ communities became more 
assertive of their identity after the violent murder of Zak Kostopoulos, a well-known 
activist within the community, by two shop owners. In response, LGBTI+ 
communities in Greece adopted collective response strategies (i.e. street protests) to 
face the populist and homophobic challenge in their country. Similarly, in Turkey 
where homophobia is prevalent both at the societal and the state levels, an LGBTI+ 
individual argued that they do not consider their vulnerable position as a pretext to 
retreat into LGBTI+ safe havens. Instead, they reclaim their identity as a form of 
resistance in their daily lives.  
The role of religion in populist discourse 
Our focus groups demonstrate that religion has become an important mechanism/instrument 
that populist movements use both to legitimize discourse (and policies). Furthermore, 
institutionalized religion (the Church in Greece and Poland) has become an important aide of 
populist movements in producing discourse and legitimizing policies. Indeed, our analysis 
also reveals that the Orthodox Church in Greece and the Catholic Church in Poland are two 
important bodies legitimating populist anti-LGBTIQ+ discourse as well as anti-abortion 
discourse (in the Polish case). Our research also shows that the Orthodox Church in Greece 
has been instrumental in the ‘othering’ of refugees and immigrants by defining these groups 
as elements that contradict with the Greek culture and the Orthodox Christian belief system. 
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Mainstreaming the hate language:  
One important and equally concerning finding of our research is the fact that the populist 
wave in Europe has not only resulted in the use of discriminatory language against certain 
vulnerable groups by populist actors. Our research demonstrates that in all countries 
participants complain about normalization of hate language in the public sphere. For instance, 
Remain voters in the UK argued that they have witnessed was an increasingly open use of 
hate language targeting immigrants and refugees in the country. Another participant in Greece 
suggested that with the rise of ultra-nationalist Golden Dawn in 2012, right-wing populist 
discourse has been normalized in Greece. A female participant said that mainstreaming of the 
hate language by populist movements made her face different forms of ‘micro-aggression’ on 
a daily basis.  
 
This finding is important, as prevalence of this language in the public sphere has forced 
mainstream political parties in Europe to express opinion on certain issues such as migration 
more clearly mostly due to electoral concerns. This is because the increasing prevalence of 
populist influence in the public sphere forced mainstream parties align their views to those of 
populist parties in order to protect their electoral base. In this respect, one can suggest that the 
strong anti-immigration discourse of pro-Brexit campaigners pushed the Conservative Party 
in the UK to take a harsher stance vis-à-vis immigration in the post-Brexit UK. This is 
because anti-immigrant discourse of pro-Brexit campaigners made conservative voters more 
sensitive about immigration issues. Thereafter, conservative voters have become more vocal 
and even hawkish about immigration, causing the Conservative Party to bandwagon as the 
party has become afraid that otherwise they would lose voters to populist political parties 
such as UKIP or, more recently, the Brexit Party.    
 
Social media data results 
Features of populist political communication on Facebook 
The quantitative analysis aims at capturing the characteristics of political parties’ 
communication on Facebook while also comparing populist and mainstream parties’. In order 
to measure populist communication, we focus on two aspects, both reflected in the text of the 
post. The first aspect that we observe is the prevalence of populist language in the text. We do 
so by employing a dictionary approach. A "dictionary" (or "lexicon") is a collection of words 
reflecting a set of specific traits or dispositions. By counting the number of such words 
included in a document, it is possible to measure the prevalence of such traits/dispositions in 
the text. In our case, the number of “populist words” found in the text of the post is an 
indicator of the degree of populist language employed in this particular post.  
To assess what words are to be regarded as “populist”, we use the dictionary proposed and 
validated by Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011). This is a widely used dictionary measuring one 
specific aspect of populism in political texts: the degree of anti-elitism. According to the 
authors, anti-elitism is easier to measure than the second facet of populism, namely people-
centrism (see Mudde 2004) as the latter is generally expressed using pronouns such as “we”, 
“us” and so on, which have a very low discriminant power (i.e., they are used in every kind of 
political communication, not only populist). The dictionary by Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011), 
on the other hand, includes terms such as ‘the elite’, ‘undemocratic’, ‘corrupt’, which are used 
by populists to refer to the elites in negative terms. Figure 1 shows the average share of 
populist words per message among mainstream and populist parties in the countries analyzed. 
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Figure 1: Use of populist language by political parties (mainstream vs. populist) 
 
In general, the frequency of words classified as populist in our dictionary is very low in all 
countries. As the figure shows, Polish populist parties are those who tend to use more of the 
populist terms in the dictionary. However, even in this case those terms make less than 0.8% 
of the total words used in their average post (i.e., our dictionary tends to pick up very 
uncommon words). This is more a feature than a bug: if the dictionary included too-common 
words, its discriminant power in identifying genuinely populist language would be low. 
Indeed, Figure 1 shows that, on average, populist parties use populist language (defined by 
anti-elitist language) more frequently in all countries, with the exception of Turkey and, to a 
lesser extent, Hungary. This is probably because, in both countries, populist parties have been 
in office for more than a decade, hence their chances of using anti-elitist language are slimmer 
by this mere fact. 
A second aspect of populist communication that we study is the references to specific issues 
or excluded social groups in the text of the post. We do so by running a topic model on the 
entire corpus of posts in each country, and classifying each post based on the probability that 
it belongs to one or more political issues, or that it mentions one or more of the excluded 
social groups, defined by us prior to the data collection. See Appendix 1 for a more detailed 
discussion about the technique and the list of political issues and excluded groups. 
Figure 2: Prevalence of issues among political parties (mainstream vs. populist) 
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Figure 2 compares populist and mainstream parties in different countries with respect to the 
frequency of their references to different issues as well as the frequency of their references to 
the target groups (e.g., religious minorities, ethnic minorities, LGBTI+). The figure shows the 
average share of words related to each of the issues identified by post. To give an example, 
words related to the topic "political conflict & process" comprise about 20% of the total 
content of the posts in Italy on average. This means that the topic is very prevalent, as it is in 
all countries except for Germany, France and, to a lesser extent, Greece. In other words, 
political parties and leaders are very likely to use Facebook to promote themselves and their 
events and to talk about each other. The analysis shows that there is considerable variation 
across countries, both in terms of the variety of issues and differences between mainstream 
and populist parties. Nevertheless, some patterns have emerged. First, populist parties are 
more likely to talk about immigration in all countries but Poland and Turkey. In Germany, 
France and the UK, populists are also more likely to talk about EU-related issues. Another 
important issue often referred by populist parties is ‘democracy and legitimacy’. Populists 
talk more frequently about ‘democracy and legitimacy’ than mainstream parties in Germany, 
France, Italy and the UK, whilst they talk less about these issues than mainstream parties in 
Greece, Hungary and Turkey. This latter finding is not surprising as in Hungary and Turkey 
populist authoritarian political parties are still in office whilst in Greece, the populist SYRIZA 
was in power until July 2019. In Poland, where another populist party is in government (PiS), 
this issue is not relevant in party communication. An issue about which populists refer to less 
than mainstream parties is the economy; Poland and Greece are exceptions to this rule. 
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Finally, looking at the targeted social groups, the only noteworthy element is the general 
tendency among populist parties to talk more about ethnic groups, the exception being 
Turkey. 
The impact of populist communication on Facebook users 
To assess the impact of different aspects of populist communication on Facebook users, we 
studied, for each post, three indicators of user engagement (our dependent variables): 1) 
number of reactions (including “likes”, “love”, “wow”, “haha”, “sad” and “angry” reactions) 
as a proxy of the interest drawn by the post, 2) number of shares as an indicator of its 
diffusion, and iii) number of comments as an indicator of the post's ability to trigger debate.  
The number of reactions reflects the degree of interest for the post. The higher this number, 
the more a post drew Facebook users' attention to the point to prompt an active reaction 
among them. We do not distinguish among reaction types for the purpose of keeping this 
indicator as close as possible to an indicator of general interest, regardless of the specific 
emotion that it could have triggered, as reflected by different reaction types. The number of 
shares is an indicator of the diffusion of the post on the social network. At the individual 
level, the choice to share a post might be interpreted as an act undertaken with the intention of 
either informing one’s contacts about something, or signaling one’s own attitudes towards the 
subject of the post, whether sincerely or ironically. In any case, at the aggregate level, a 
higher number of shares to a post indicates that the post is spread more in the network. 
Finally, the number of comments reflects the extent to which a post could trigger a discussion 
among Facebook users. All these three indicators are empirically interrelated. The more the 
shares to a post, the wider its spread and therefore higher the chances to trigger a reaction or a 
comment. Similarly, posts that receive more likes, comments or shares are more likely to be 
picked by Facebook algorithm and shown to other users, further spreading in the network. 
Nevertheless, in principle, they reflect different aspects of the level of engagement that a post 
can produce. 
We investigate how these two characteristics of Facebook posts that we presented above 
(namely, the prevalence of populist language and the probability that each post belongs to the 
issues or mentions the target groups listed in Figure 2) are related to these three indicators of 
citizens’ engagement with posts. We do so by fitting three multilevel linear regressions, with 
posts nested in page and week/year units.7 
To provide a more comprehensive picture, we discuss the main results for the pooled models, 
where data from all countries are considered together and modeled simultaneously. For the 
sake of discussion, we only report coefficient plots (see Appendix 2 for the table with full 
results). Figure 3 below displays the coefficients of the variables of interest for the three 
dependent variables. The horizontal error bars surrounding the points represent 90% 
confidence intervals. When they do not cross the vertical dotted line, it means that the 
coefficients are statistically significant, and their effect is worth discussing.  
The first important finding is the positive effect of the number of populist words on all three 
dependent variables, meaning that a higher prevalence of anti-elitist tone in the post produces 
more reactions, shares, and comments. Hence, the use of populist language pays off in terms 
of attracting more reactions for parties and politicians on Facebook.  
                                                 
7 From the three dependent variables we remove the 1% highest and 1% lowest values, to avoid the chance that 
outlier observations drive the results. All the models have been fit using the package “lme4” in R. 
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Looking at the probability of the post referring to three target groups considered here, a few 
effects are worth noting. First, posts making more references to religious minorities (such as 
Muslims or Jews) generally trigger fewer reactions among the users of the social network site. 
On the other hand, Facebook posts that make references to ethnic minorities, such as 
immigrants or asylum seekers, as well as country-specific minorities like Roma or Kurds, 
trigger more reactions, and these posts are shared more. Therefore, references to excluded 
social groups (targeted by populist actors) do not have a significant effect on the engagement 
level of that particular post, unless the referred target group is an ethnic minority. 
Figure 3: Coefficient plot of relevant post characteristics on number of reactions, shares, 
and comments 
We find evidence to confirm this pattern in our analysis of issues. First of all, posts that refer 
to “immigration” trigger more reactions and shares and produce more discussion. This is the 
strongest effect found for the variables measuring characteristics of the post. Accordingly, 
immigration is an issue attracting major interest on Facebook, whether it is expressed through 
references to targeted social groups or through references to the issue in abstract. 
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Other significant effects deserving attention are as follows. ‘Political conflict and process’ is 
an issue producing considerable engagement on Facebook. This issue captures all the topics 
in which there are names of politicians or references to political scandals, self-promotion, and 
attacks. In other words, this is a topic reflecting politicians talking about politics. ‘Covid-19 & 
healthcare’ issue produces fewer numbers of reactions, but more shares. Hence, Facebook 
users are more likely to share on their profile a post about the pandemic, probably to pass the 
information it contains to their contact list, but overall they express less interest for this issue. 
A similar pattern is observed with respect to the issue of ‘economy’. The presence of 
‘democracy & legitimacy’ issues or ‘crime & national security’ issues in a post triggers more 
shares, and also more comments for the latter, but these issues’ presence have no significant 
effect on the number of reactions to this post. Finally, the following issues trigger 
significantly less reactions, shares and comments: ‘environment’, ‘elections’, ‘education & 
culture’, and ‘foreign affairs’. 
Figure 4: Coefficient plot of relevant page characteristics on number of reactions, shares 
and comments 
 
Figure 4 displays the effect of characteristics of the page making the post (whether the party 
or politician is classified as populist, the number of followers, and the page type) on the three 
dependent variables. The most important finding here is that pages of populist parties, in 
general, obtain more reactions, shares, and comments to their posts than mainstream parties. 
Here the size of the effect is considerable. Populist parties and politicians’ Facebook posts 
trigger about 500 more shares and comments, and almost 3,000 more reactions, than their 
non-populist rivals on average. This means that populist parties and politicians are more 
successful on Facebook and are winning the race for audience attention on Facebook.  
Conclusions 
In this working paper, we explored the reactions and responses of groups targeted by populist 
parties and politicians. Focus groups with target groups and a collection of about one year of 
Facebook posts by parties, leaders and political media stars, bear important implications. 
Our findings provide a roadmap for policymakers to assist vulnerable groups and to tackle 
populist discourse and policies. Three strategies used by target groups to counterbalance the 
populist challenge (echo-chambers, self-censorship, and migration) are defensive strategies, 
which harm diversity and freedom of expression in Europe and we find these unsustainable in 
the long-term. Forms of active resistance that are embraced especially by marginalized gender 
groups such as LGBTI+ and feminists promise more potential in eradicating the negative 
effects of populist discourse and policies. Empowering people’s marginalized identities 
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through civil society organizations, street protests and increased visibility can both offer 
alternative discourses to populism and encourage other groups targeted by populist 
movements to actively resist attacks on their identity. A particular policy could be supporting 
civil society organizations that may help to increase the visibility as well as the discourses of 
marginalized groups. However, in the absence of more comprehensive measures that could 
decrease the influence of populist discourse on public opinion, these steps may prove 
insufficient.  
We therefore suggest policymakers to pay more attention to social media as a potential venue 
to counterpoise the negative effects of populism. Our research demonstrates that populist 
actors are far more successful than mainstream political actors in using social media and 
disseminating their message. However, leaving the realm of the social media to the mercy of 
populist actors might have devastating consequences on the nature of democratic politics (i.e. 
Trump presidency). Accordingly, policymakers should prioritize developing innovative ways 
to use social media as a primary instrument to fight off the negative effects of populist 
discourse on target groups. One particular way is forcing all social media platforms to 
incorporate checks against hate language especially when used by politicians. Another 
mechanism could be making truth-checking mechanisms compulsory for news sources shared 
on social media. These steps would diminish the playground of populist actors on social 
media.  
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Appendix 1: Detailed Quantitative Text Analysis Methodology 
In order to measure populist communication, we focus on two aspects, both reflected in the 
text of the post. The first aspect that we observe is the prevalence of populist language in the 
text. We do so by employing a dictionary approach, in the same vein to what is elsewhere 
called “sentiment analysis”. The logic is simple: a dictionary is a collection of words 
reflecting a set of specific traits or disposition. In classic sentiment analysis, dictionaries 
including collections of “positive” and “negative” words are applied to a corpus of texts to 
measure how people evaluate a target, such as a product. In our case, the number of “populist 
words” found in the text of the post is an indicator of the degree of populist language 
employed in this particular post.  
To assess what words are to be regarded as “populist”, we use the dictionary proposed and 
validated by Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011). This is a widely-used dictionary measuring one 
specific aspect of populism in political texts: the degree of anti-elitism. According to the 
authors, anti-elitism is easier to measure than the second facet of populism, namely people-
centrism (see Mudde 2004) as the latter is generally expressed using pronouns such as “we”, 
“us” and so on, which have a very low discriminant power (i.e., they are used in every kind of 
political communication, not only populist). The dictionary by Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011), 
on the other hand, includes terms such as ‘the elite’, ‘undemocratic’, ‘corrupt’, which are used 
by populists to refer to the elites in negative terms. The original dictionary by Rooduijn and 
Pauwels is available in four languages only (Dutch, English, German and Italian), and it was 
translated into other languages by Poletti (2013). We took from there the translation to 
French, Greek, Hungarian and Polish, and asked the DEMOS country experts to check the 
word lists in their own language to attempt a validation. Finally, Osman Sahin from the 
DEMOS team curated the translation of the dictionary into Turkish.8  
A second aspect of populist communication that we are interested in regards the references to 
specific issues or excluded social groups in the text of the post. We observe that using a 
different technique. We first ran a topic model on the entire corpus of posts in each country. 
Topic models are methods to statistically find clusters of words that co-occur frequently in the 
same documents. The basic logic of this technique is that topics are characterized by a 
specific language, or more precisely, by a specific choice of words. For instance, when a 
politician talks about the economy, s/he will likely use a specific collection of nouns, verbs 
and adjectives, such as “job”, “growth”, “incentive”, and so on. A topic model will find the 
groups of words that are most likely to appear together, and will assign them to the same 
topics. Then, the technique will assign to every document a probability to be about each of the 
topics extracted. Topic models are a very powerful tool for unsupervised classification of 
documents, used in many different applications.  
There are two characteristics of topic models that make the use of this technique challenging. 
First, the number of topics present in a collection of documents has to be set a priori. In other 
words, if the researcher decides that the collection of documents includes 10 topics, the model 
will find 10 clusters of words, regardless whether the true number of topics discussed in the 
collection is more or less than 10. This makes finding the “best”, or “most correct”, number of 
topics a very important task to ensure the validity of the method. To do so, we used a 
combination of different techniques. We started by fitting a set of topic models with different 
                                                 
8 The dictionary proposed by Rooduijn and Pauwels includes a set of “core words”, that are included in all 
languages and of “context-specific” words that can be added by country experts as relevant in their specific 
country. In our case, the Demos country experts were asked also to add context-specific words in case they had 
any. 
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numbers of topics ranging from 10 to 250, and checked three different measures of model fit. 
This produced some best-fitting values, which correspond in each country to the dashed 
vertical lines in Figure A1. Secondly, we used the method proposed by Lee and Mimno 
(2014) implemented in the R package “stm” (see Roberts et al., 2019) to find the best number 
of topics. To do so we fit a structural topic model (see Roberts et al., 2014) including the 
party label and week of the post as predictors to increase the precision of the estimated topic, 
and leaving the number of topics to be guessed by the algorithm. This produced the values 
corresponding to the solid vertical lines in Figure A1.  
 
Figure A1: Finding the best number of topics – results from "ldatuning" (dashed 




We then compared the two identified solutions by checking two indicators of topic quality, 
the semantic coherence (an indicator of the extent to which words belonging to the same topic 
appear together in the same document) and exclusivity (the extent to which the words 
appearing with greater probability in one topic are less likely to appear in other topics). The 








Figure A2: Semantic coherence and exclusivity by different numbers of topics. The 
topics in G1 are those obtained using the metrics from "ldatuning", those in G2 have 
been obtained using "stm" and setting K=0, and those in G3 have been obtained using 
as number of topics a value in between the two. 
 
 
As the figure shows, in some cases, looking at semantic coherence and exclusivity led to an 
obvious choice. In other cases, a third round was necessary. Eventually, we found a solution 
in each country, which was regarded as acceptable by the country experts. The number of 
topics extracted in each country was the following: 
 
DE FR GR HU IT PL TR UK 
78 94 90 63 51 80 80 82 
 
The second problem with topic models is that they only find clusters of words, but they say 
nothing about the content of the topic. This has to be done manually. Hence, in each country 
and for each topic, we extracted a list of 30 words with the highest probability to be in the 
topic, and sent these lists to the country experts. Based on the lists of words, we asked the 
experts to guess the content of the topics, with respect to two things: (1) the political issue the 
topic refers to, and (2) whether the topic makes reference to one or more excluded social 
groups. We provided the following issue list to the country experts: 
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● Economic issues 
● Immigration 
● Covid-19 & healthcare 
● EU 
● Foreign affairs 
● Environment 
● Crime & national security 
● Education & culture 
● Societal values & religion 
● Political conflict & process 
● Elections 
● Democracy & legitimacy 
● Country-specific issue [specify] 
With respect to the excluded social groups, we asked the experts to indicate whether the topic 
makes reference to “foreigners or ethnic minorities” (including immigrants, refugees and 
asylum seekers, excluding foreign governments or institutions), “religious minorities”, 
“LGBT-related communities”, or other “country-specific excluded groups”. 
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Appendix 2: Analysis regression table 
Table 1: Pooled multilevel models (all continuous variables are standardized) 
  Likes Shares Comments 
Intercept 231.47 647.67*** 2.17 
  (767.43) (146.89) (204.29) 
Number of populist words 79.38*** 79.68*** 27.15*** 
  (16.39) (4.95) (4.17) 
Populist party 2787.46*** 609.12*** 550.86** 
  (645.10) (121.67) (195.48) 
Message length 43.98* 36.77*** 28.26*** 
  (18.09) (5.42) (4.61) 
Number of page followers (100s) 1246.78*** 52.81 -96.84** 
  (116.78) (32.32) (29.65) 
Issues 
   
  
   
     Economy -145.48*** 27.47*** -8.99* 
  (15.66) (4.70) (3.98) 
     Immigration 185.26*** 172.92*** 107.54*** 
  (23.24) (6.99) (5.91) 
     Covid-19/Health -80.18*** 20.85*** -0.62 
  (17.26) (5.15) (4.39) 
     EU 3.95 -1.95 5.98 
  (15.94) (4.79) (4.06) 
     Foreign Affairs -40.34** 1.92 -5.79 
  (14.98) (4.50) (3.81) 
     Environment -36.56* -16.76*** -17.52*** 
  (14.85) (4.45) (3.77) 
     Crime/Security 31.70 32.99*** -4.34 
  (16.61) (4.98) (4.23) 
     Education/Culture -114.60*** -18.98*** -17.89*** 
  (14.47) (4.33) (3.67) 
     Values/Religion 21.98 1.84 -7.32 
  (16.13) (4.81) (4.09) 
     Politics 45.66** 46.38*** 53.91*** 
  (17.32) (5.20) (4.41) 
     Elections -145.18*** -26.29*** -21.53*** 
  (17.18) (5.14) (4.36) 
     Democracy 8.97 34.22*** 15.44*** 
  (16.95) (5.09) (4.31) 
Excluded social groups 
   
  
   
     Ethnic 68.05** 28.74*** 4.15 
  (22.99) (6.89) (5.83) 
     Religious -34.94* -5.86 -5.82 
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Table 1: Pooled multilevel models (all continuous variables are standardized) 
  Likes Shares Comments 
  (16.48) (4.93) (4.20) 
     Gender 0.36 -2.55 5.47 
  (15.15) (4.52) (3.82) 
Post type (base = Status) 
   
  
   
     Photo 233.36** -497.09*** -37.38 
  (78.98) (23.62) (20.10) 
     Link -1000.23*** -640.69*** -171.97*** 
  (86.40) (25.87) (21.98) 
     Video -165.81* -236.73*** 54.88** 
  (81.06) (24.26) (20.65) 
Page type (base = Party) 
   
  
   
     Leader 2264.87*** 212.33 408.91* 
  (636.45) (119.90) (164.14) 
     Media Star 2925.63*** 389.38** 722.43*** 
  (768.14) (144.94) (198.88) 
Country (base = DE) 
   
  
   
     FR 230.34 -44.12 -13.56 
  (954.42) (180.24) (246.44) 
     GR 123.14 -454.01* -293.11 
  (1222.62) (230.61) (316.99) 
     HU 393.34 -178.83 -314.16 
  (1009.50) (189.82) (261.23) 
     IT 3176.14** 483.94* 1090.48*** 
  (1070.53) (201.51) (276.86) 
     PL -600.27 -422.11* -386.78 
  (1068.81) (200.74) (276.56) 
     TK 3777.75*** -8.90 322.73 
  (1125.84) (215.49) (287.77) 
     UK 1380.51 120.72 306.22 
  (999.72) (188.60) (258.89) 
AIC 2484117.87 2187007.86 2149470.59 
BIC 2484458.71 2187348.77 2149821.29 
Log Likelihood -1242023.94 -1093468.93 -1074699.29 
N obs 125286 125536 125727 
N year/week 114 114 114 
N page 77 77 77 
Var Intercept (year/week) 8741419.04 305192.52 583249.63 
Var Intercept (page) 436668.74 14556.15 29097.15 
Var Residual 23799627.18 2147175.01 1549234.63 
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05 
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